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Abstrakt
Tato bakalářská práce popisuje jak teoretické základy, tak způsob vytvoření statického
analyzátoru založeném na platformě .NET Framework a službách poskytnutých prostřed-
nictvím .NET Compiler Platform. Tento analyzátor detekuje bezpečnostní slabiny typu
SQL injection na platformě ASP.NET MVC. Analyzátor nejdříve sestrojuje grafy řízení
toku jako abstraktní reprezentaci analyzovaného programu. Poté využívá statické analýzy
pro sledování potenciálně nedůvěryhodných dat. Nakonec jsou výsledky analýzy prezen-
továny uživateli.
Abstract
This Bachelor thesis is intended to describe theoretical foundations as well as the con-
struction of a static taint analyser based on the .NET Framework and the analysis services
provided by the .NET Compiler Platform. This analyser detects SQL injection security vul-
nerabilities on the ASP.NET MVC platform. Firstly, the analyser constructs control flow
graphs as an abstract representation of the analysed program. Then, it uses a static taint
analysis to track potentially distrusted and tainted data values. Finally, analysis results
are presented to the user.
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Introduction
Because the complexity of computer systems permanently increases, it gets harder to satisfy
security demands that are expected from such systems. Software developers therefore need
tools that help them to detect security threats in their software. The sooner a security flaw
is discovered, the cheaper is to fix such flaw.
This thesis deals with the design and implementation of a static code analyser that
mitigates SQL injection security vulnerabilities. This analyser is built upon the .NET
Compiler Platform—a set of open-source compilers and code analysis APIs for C# and Vi-
sual Basic languages. It performs an interprocedural value-based analysis using supergraph
as a representation of the analysed program.
In order to render the static analyser as much usable as possible, the analyser is in-
tegrated into the Visual Studio IDE to provide analysis results to the developer within a
familiar environment.
Chapter 1 introduces common security challenges the developers must face when im-
plementing web-based applications. It focuses on SQL injection vulnerability as one of
the most prevalent security threat. Chapter 2 introduces theoretical foundations of a data
flow analysis. Chapter 3 presents the .NET Compiler Platform and APIs that serve as a
source of information about analysed program. Chapter 4 deals with design of a static taint
analyser and Chapter 5 describes its implementation.
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Chapter 1
Security of Web-based
Applications
Today’s Internet is arguably the largest engineered system created by mankind. This net-
work interconnects hundreds of millions computer devices as well as billions of users around
the world. This connection and ability to communicate through the Internet have got also
its drawbacks: network software systems are exposed to a wide variety of security threats
coming from the Internet. As our digital infrastructure gets increasingly complex, the
difficulty of achieving software security increases excessively.
Developers of such software systems must put much more emphasis on the software
security nowadays. Unfortunately, much of the activity invested in the area of security is
not really about solving security problems. It is about mitigating the consequences that
security problems create. A lot of the effort put into this area simply does not focus on a
prevention of security problems. Virus scanners, intrusion detection systems, and others
are meant to compensate shortcomings of software security [3].
Changing the state of software is about changing the way how the software is developed.
This thesis proposes a static code analysis as the way to identify security vulnerabilities
before they can be exploited.
1.1 Static Code Analysis
Static code analysis examines properties of computer software based on its source code with-
out actually executing it [2]. This sort of analysis can be applied in many areas including
compiler optimizations, bug hunting, and security reviews. In the area of security, auto-
mated static code analysis can be more effective in detecting security defects than manual
code review which is a costly and error-prone process.
Static analysis is a powerful tool because it can quickly consider many possibilities.
This tool can explore a lot of scenarios and corner cases of possible program execution
without actually executing the code. Static analysis is particularly useful in the security
area because lot of security problems happen in the corner cases which are hard to test
during normal code execution.
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1.2 Web-based Security Threats
In order to understand difficulty and complexity of web-based applications security, it is
essential to introduce the most prevalent security vulnerabilities and explain how to avoid
them. The potential of error is limitless, but in practice, the most common security mistakes
are repeated by the programming community on daily basis. For example, let’s focus on a
well-known security threat called a buffer overflow.
A buffer overflow condition exists when a program is trying to put more data into a
buffer than it can hold or when a program attempts to write data past the memory area
of a buffer. This vulnerability can be exploited by writing data outside the bounds of
the assigned memory area with potential to corrupt data, crash the program, or cause the
execution of malicious code [3].
This significant repetition of known security problems suggests that despite the pro-
gramming community awareness, these security vulnerabilities are still frequent. The buffer
overflow vulnerability is known for almost two decades and serves as excellent example of
this point. The next section focuses on concrete security threats which are prevalent nowa-
days.
1.3 Open Web Application Security Project
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide not-for-profit organi-
zation focused on improving the security of software 1. The OWASP organization includes
corporations, educational institutions, as well as individuals from around the world. This
community works to create freely available articles, documents, and methodologies address-
ing the security area.
One of the documents published by the OWASP is called the OWASP Top 10 [7]. The
goal of the Top 10 project is to raise awareness about the application security by identifying
some of the most critical risks facing organizations. The OWASP Top 10 was first released
in 2003, and the last version was released in 2013. Follows the list of security threats taken
from the latest OWASP Top 10:
1. Injection. Injection flaws, such as SQL, OS, and LDAP injection occur when untrusted
data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker’s hostile
data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data
without proper authorization.
2. Broken Authentication and Session Management. Application functions related to
authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, allow-
ing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, or session tokens, or to exploit other
implementation flaws to assume other users’ identities.
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes untrusted
data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows
attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which can hijack user sessions,
deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.
4. Insecure Direct Object References. A direct object reference occurs when a developer
exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory,
1http://www.owasp.org
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or database key. Without an access control check or other protection, attackers can
manipulate these references to access unauthorized data.
5. Security Misconfiguration. Good security requires having a secure configuration de-
fined and deployed for the application, frameworks, application server, web server,
database server, and platform. Secure settings should be defined, implemented, and
maintained, as defaults are often insecure. Additionally, software should be kept up
to date.
6. Sensitive Data Exposure. Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive
data, such as credit cards, tax IDs, and authentication credentials. Attackers may
steal or modify such weakly protected data to conduct credit card fraud, identity
theft, or other crimes. Sensitive data deserves extra protection such as encryption at
rest or in transit, as well as special precautions when exchanged with the browser.
7. Missing Function Level Access Control. Most web applications verify function level
access rights before making that functionality visible in the UI. However, applications
need to perform the same access control checks on the server when each function is
accessed. If requests are not verified, attackers will be able to forge requests in order
to access functionality without proper authorization.
8. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim’s browser
to send a forged HTTP request, including the victim’s session cookie and any other
automatically included authentication information, to a vulnerable web application.
This allows the attacker to force the victim’s browser to generate requests the vul-
nerable application thinks are legitimate requests from the victim.
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities. Components, such as libraries, frame-
works, and other software modules, almost always run with full privileges. If a vulner-
able component is exploited, such an attack can facilitate serious data loss or server
takeover. Applications using components with known vulnerabilities may undermine
application defence and enable a range of possible attacks and impacts.
10. Invalidated Redirects and Forwards. Web applications frequently redirect and forward
users to other pages and websites, and use untrusted data to determine the destina-
tion pages. Without proper validation, attackers can redirect victims to phishing or
malware sites, or use forwards to access unauthorized pages.
Many of these security vulnerabilities can be mitigated with static code analysis tools.
This Bachelor thesis focuses on a data flow related security threat called an SQL injection
and possible mitigation of this threat with the use of the static analysis.
1.4 SQL Injection
SQL injection is the vulnerability that results when the application gives an attacker the
ability to influence Structured Query Language (SQL) queries that an application passes
to a back-end database. Ability to influence SQL commands can an attacker misuse to
leverage the power of supporting database and operating system functionality [4].
SQL injection is an attack in which SQL code is inserted into application input param-
eters that are later processed by a back-end SQL server. Any procedure that parses SQL
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text is potentially vulnerable to an SQL attack, as diversity of SQL and procedures that
parse SQL provide wealth of coding options. The primary option of an SQL attack is to
directly insert SQL code into application input parameters that are then processed as SQL
commands.
Less direct approach is to insert malicious text into strings that are stored in an appli-
cation persistence store. The stored strings may be subsequently processed and potentially
concatenated with an SQL code and then executed against a back-end database.
When an application fails to properly sanitize input parameters that take part in a
dynamic creation of SQL statements, the attacker is able to alter the construction of these
statements. As the attacker can modify an SQL statement, the statement will run with the
same set of privileges and user rights as the original user. Unfortunately, processes that
execute SQL commands are often highly privileged.
1.4.1 SQL Injection Example
To illustrate an example of SQL injection vulnerability, let’s consider fictitious web applica-
tion accessible via http://www.example.com URL address. This application provides log
in functionality through http://www.example.com/Login address.
The log in functionality is implemented in Figure 1.1. It is ASP.NET MVC code snippet
representing action method called Login that authenticates users. User-supplied log in
credentials are retrieved through the method parameters (username and password).
public ActionResult Login(string username, string password)
{
var query = "SELECT userid FROM users WHERE name = ’" + username + "’
AND passwd = ’" + password + "’";
using (var connection = new SqlConnection("connection string"))
using (var command = new SqlCommand(query, connection))
{
int rowsAffected = command.ExecuteNonQuery();
if (rowsAffected != 0)
throw new InvalidCredentialsException();
}
FormsAuthentication.SetAuthCookie(username, true);
return View();
}
Figure 1.1: ASP.NET MVC code snippet vulnerable to the SQL injection.
This action method might be triggered by accessing the following URL address:
http://www.example.com/Login?username=user&password=123
Credentials are passed through HTTP GET method to the ASP.NET application.
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The Login action method dynamically creates an SQL statement that will return the
number of affected records by the statement. The SQL statement that the .NET code
builds is more clearly illustrated in the following code snippet:
SELECT userid FROM users WHERE name = ’user’ AND passwd = ’123’
The problem with the application code is that the application developer believes that
the number of affected rows always will be zero or one. This is a dangerous assumption
since the user might supply arbitrary data that are then processed by an SQL server. This
data might be used to change the meaning of the SQL statement to always return true.
By appending the string ’ OR ’1’ = ’1 to the following URL address, the SQL statement
will return all records from the users table.
http://www.example.com/Login?username=user&password=123’ OR ’1’ = ’1
This is because the user altered the logic of the SQL statement. The WHERE condition
of the SQL statement always yields true value. Here is the query that would be built and
executed:
SELECT userid FROM users WHERE name = ’user’ AND passwd = ’123’ OR ’1’ = ’1’
If the database returns more than zero records, the user will receive an authentication
cookie. This cookie will ensure that the attacker is authenticated during the browsing
session without providing valid user credentials.
1.5 Preventing SQL Injection
The preceding section presented an example of a common SQL injection vulnerability in
the ASP.NET MVC environment. This section describes various methods how to prevent
SQL injection at the code level [4].
1.5.1 Using Parameterized Statements
The root cause of an SQL injection attack is the dynamic building of SQL statements.
The alternative approach to dynamic building is to use parameterized statements. Most
modern database access APIs allow to provide parameters to an SQL query through place-
holders instead of working directly with the user input. When the user input is bind to
the place-holder, the database access API sanitizes the input and thus mitigates possible
threat. Figure 1.2 shows how to apply parameterized statements on the example presented
in Figure 1.1.
1.5.2 Validating Input
Other approach to mitigate SQL injection vulnerabilities is to validate a user-supplied
input. It means to test input received by the application for compliance against some
pattern. There are two methods to validate input:
• Whitelisting is the practice of only accepting input that is known to be harmless.
This can involve validating compliance against data type, length, numeric range, and
others.
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var query = "SELECT userid FROM users WHERE name = @user AND passwd =
@passwd";
using (var connection = new SqlConnection("connection string"))
using (var command = new SqlCommand(query, connection))
{
command.Parameters.AddWithValue("@user", username);
command.Parameters.AddWithValue("@passwd", password);
int rowsAffected = command.ExecuteNonQuery();
if (rowsAffected != 0)
throw new InvalidCredentialsException();
}
Figure 1.2: ASP.NET MVC code snippet using parametrized statements when accessing
database.
• Blacklisting is the practice of rejecting input that is known to be malicious. This
approach is generally weaker than whitelisting because the blacklisting is much less
strict. A common method of implementing blacklisting is to use regular expressions.
1.5.3 Using Abstraction Layers
Abstraction layers defined in an application design can enforce security policy that mitigates
security vulnerabilities. Depending on the technology in use, this may involve an additional
data access abstraction layer such as Hibernate, ActiveRecord, or Entity Framework. For
many of these frameworks developers will not have to write a single line of SQL in the
application.
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Chapter 2
Data Flow Analysis
Data flow analysis is a process of deriving information about the run time behaviour of
a program [8]. Data flow analysis statically gathers information about the flow of data
for each program point in the program being analysed. This information must be a safe
approximation of the run time behaviour of the program during execution of all possible
execution paths.
2.1 Data Flow Analysis Properties
Although, the data flow analysis and program analysis as a whole have indeed large set of
applications, they can be characterized by some common properties. These properties help
understand useful insights about particular analyser.
Data flow analysis can be characterized by the following properties:
2.1.1 Approach to Program Analysis
Data flow analysis uses Constraint Resolution Systems based on equalities called Data Flow
Equations. Constraint resolution systems consist of a constraint store and logic for solving
constraints. In such systems, the semantic properties are derived by finding a solution that
satisfies all the constraints. Traditionally, the constraints are called flow-based constraints
because they have been solved by traversals over trees or graphs.
2.1.2 Time of Performing Analysis
Program analysis that is performed before the execution of a program is called a static
analysis. The term dynamic analysis is used when the analysis is performed during the
execution of a program. During a dynamic analysis, execution of a program code is in-
terleaved with analysis. An interpreter can therefore use a static analysis when parsing
instructions and dynamic analysis during interpretation.
On the other hand, a compiler can only perform a static analysis because it does not
execute a program code directly. In order to enable a dynamic analysis of compiler generated
code, the compiler inserts extra code into the compiled program to enable run time analysis.
The choice between static and dynamic analysis strongly depends on performance re-
quirements of a particular application. As noted above, dynamic analysis is executed in
an interleaved fashion and therefore puts burden to an application performance. As this is
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often problem—in practice a majority of analyses performed are static. Data flow analysis
is mainly static, although a dynamic data flow analysis is possible.
2.1.3 Scope of Analysis
Analysed program can be viewed as a tree like structure consisting of smaller sub-structures.
Program analyser discovers information about a concrete structure by analysing and gath-
ering information of its dependent sub-structures. Analysis can be therefore focused on a
small structure as an expression, a statement, or to larger structures as group of statements
to methods and even entire programs.
The sub-structures that belong to the same structure are analysed independently. Anal-
ysis of a structure and its sub-structure may be interleaved or may be non-overlapping. In
either case, the larger structure can be analysed only after their dependent sub-structures
are analysed.
Data flow analysis can be performed on almost all levels of scope in a program. In the
domain of imperative languages, the following points represent different scopes of data flow
analysis:
• Local Data Flow Analysis operates across statements but is limited to a single basic
block. Basic blocks are later described in Section 2.2.
• Global (intraprocedural) Data Flow Analysis operates across basic blocks but is lim-
ited to a single method.
• Interprocedural Data Flow Analysis operates across method boundaries.
2.1.4 Program Representation
Analysis is commonly performed on some intermediate representation of an analysed pro-
gram which has more suitable internal structure. These representations can be linear data
structures, hierarchical data structures (abstract syntax trees), or non-linear structures
(graphs). The graphs may capture linear abstractions of control flow (as in control flow
graphs) or hierarchical abstractions of control flow (as in call graphs).
Possible program representations for a data flow analysis are abstract syntax trees
(ASTs), directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), control flow graphs (CFGs), static single assign-
ment (SSA) forms, and others.
Our analyser uses supergraph as an internal representation. Supergraph is created by
connecting control flow graphs of different procedures. These CFGs are constructed from
ASTs in our solution as described later in Section 4.1.
2.1.5 Representation of Information
The most common representation of information is set. The elements of a set can represent
states of models, or facts that hold at a given program point. Most analysers require these
sets to be finite. In case of infinite sets, some form of summary is needed. In case of a
data flow analysis, the most common representation is set of program entities as variables
or expressions satisfying particular property. These sets are implemented using bit vectors
as described in the next Section 2.2.
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2.2 Bit Vector Data Flow Analysis
The bit vector arises from the fact that not only can the data flow information be represented
by bit vectors, it can also be computed using bit vector operations alone [8].
Data flows analysis views computation of data through expressions and transition of
data through assignments to variables. Data flow is driven by program entities such as
expressions, variables, and statements. Data flow analysis must perform two steps for
given program entity: a) discover the effect of individual statements on the expression, and
b) relate these effects across statements in the program. For the purpose of efficiency, these
two steps are represented by a basic block instead of a single statement. A basic block is
a group of consecutive statements in the program that has a strict sequential control flow
between them.
The first step (discovering the effect of individual statements) is a local data flow anal-
ysis problem and the second step represents a global data flow analysis as defined in Sec-
tion 2.1.3.
Relating the effects across basic blocks involves propagating data flow information from
a basic block to another along the direction of control flow or against it. Propagation of
data flow information along the direction of control flow is called a forward flow. In the
case of the opposite direction, the propagation is called a backward flow.
Global data flow information is associated with entry and exit points of a basic block.
For a given basic block n, the entry point is represented as Entry(n). The exit point
is represented as Exit(n). They represent possible states of a program just before and
after the execution of a basic block n. Concrete data flow values associated with them are
typically denoted as Inn and Outn. For bit vector frameworks, the term Genn denotes
data flow information that is created in basic block n. The term Killn represents data flow
information that is invalidated in block n.
The relationship between local and global data flow information for a block n (i.e.,
Inn, Outn, Genn, and Killn) and between global data flow information across different
blocks is captured by a system of linear equations called data flow equations.
A basic block can have predecessors and successors. Given a CFG edge n1 → n2 where
n1 and n2 are unidirectionally connected blocks, the n1 is a predecessor of the block n2 and
the n2 is a successor of the block n1. Predecessors of a block n are denoted as pred(n) and
successors of a block n are denoted as succ(n).
Every CFG contains exactly one basic block that has no predecessors and one block
that has no successors. These blocks are denoted as Start and End respectively.
2.2.1 Taint Analysis Example
Taint analysis, a form of information-flow analysis, establishes whether values from dis-
trusted methods and parameters may flow into security-sensitive operations [12]. It is a
case of forward flow propagation. Principle of taint analysis is more elaborated in Sec-
tion 2.4.
The data flow equations that define taint analysis for a basic block n are:
Inn =

BI n is Start block⋃
p∈pred(n)
Outp otherwise (2.1)
Outn = fn(Inn) (2.2)
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In the above, pred(n) are predecessor blocks of block n. BI is the information that
is available at the Start block of the control flow graph. Inn and Outn are data flow
variables whose values are being defined by the data flow equations. The use of ∪ symbol
in Equation 4.1 captures “any path” nature of a data flow and is called a meet operator.
The flow function fn is the transformation effected by the basic block n on a data flow
value.
Two important and related properties of flow functions are monotonicity and distribu-
tivity.
A function f : L 7→ L is called monotonic iff
∀x, y ∈ L : x ⊆ y ⇒ f(x) ⊆ f(y). (2.3)
Monotonicity ensures that the flow functions are well-behaved in the sense that they
preserve the order of approximations.
A function f : L 7→ L is called distributive iff
∀x, y ∈ L : f(x ∩ y) = f(x) ∩ f(y). (2.4)
Distributivity is a stronger condition then the monotonicity. Distributive function not
only preserves the order of approximations, it also guarantees that merging information
before function application does not result in any loss of precision.
Given a data flow problem, we associate data flow variables with entry and exit points
of each basic block. The data flow values are then related through flow equations. In order
to get a solution of these equations, each data flow variable is initialized with a value, and
the flow equations are iterated over until the value converges.
As said earlier, data flow value is represented as a set in a classical bit vector data flow
analysis. All possible values of a concrete data flow variable can be defined as a lattice.
Lattice is a partially ordered set in which every two elements have a supremum and
infimum [6]. Supremum is also called a least upper bound or join and infimum is also
called a greatest lower bound or meet.
Although lattices can be theoretically infinite, the algorithms and analyser presented
in this Bachelor thesis, work only with finite lattices. Such finite lattice is showed in
Figure 2.1. Given the taint analysis example, this lattice represents a possible taint states
of four variables (a, b, c, and d) defined in a program. For example, the value {a, b} states
that two program variables (a and b) may be tainted at a given program point.
When working with finite lattices, one might work with an element which is weaker
than any other element in the lattice. Such an element is called the least element and is
denoted as ⊥. Similarly, the greatest element is denoted as >. Given the Figure 2.1, the
greatest element of this lattice is > = ∅ and the least element is ⊥ = {a, b, c, d}.
2.3 Global Data Flow Analysis
As noted in Section 2.1.3, global data flow analysis operates across basic blocks but is
limited to a single method. In order to get a solution of a data flow problem for a method,
the data flow equations related to this method must be solved.
The most common way to solve data flow equations is to use an iterative algorithm.
Firstly, it starts with an approximation of the Inn values for each basic block n. The Outn
values are then computed through transformation functions fn(Inn). Then, the Inn values
are updated by applying the meet operators. The latter two steps are then repeated to
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{a, b, c, d}
{a, b, c} {a, b, d} {a, c, d} {b, c, d}
{a, b} {a, c} {a, d} {b, c} {b, d} {c, d}
{a} {b} {c} {d}
∅
Figure 2.1: A lattice (v,⊂) ordered by “is subset of” binary relation where v = {a, b, c, d}.
reach a fixed point assignment—the state in which Inn values (and therefore Outn values)
do not change through assignments and thus converge [11].
The values used in a global data flow analysis should provide conservative information.
This means that the values does not change intended semantic of a program. Assignment
that provides such a conservative information is called a safe assignment. A safe assignment
represents a valid solution of data flow analysis.
The maximum safe assignment is the largest safe assignment (with largest information
potential). It represents the largest possible solution and implies that no useful informa-
tion has been missed in the assignment. Given above definitions, the maximum fixed point
assignment (MFP assignment) is the largest fixed point assignment. Summary of assign-
ment relationships is shown in Figure 2.2.
all possible
assignments
safe assignments
fixed point
assignments
Figure 2.2: Assignments hiearchy in a data flow problem.
2.3.1 Round-Robin Iterative Algorithm
The most basic iterative algorithm for solving data flow problems is called a Round-robin
iterative algorithm presented in Algorithm 1. This algorithm reaches the fixpoint by it-
erating across all basic blocks until the data flow properties stabilise [11]. Although the
algorithm works in a fixed order traversal, it is not necessary for convergence of data flow
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properties.
Algorithm 1 Round-robin iterative algorithm
Input: A data flow framework containing N blocks. The Start node is numbered 0. The
rest of the blocks are arbitrary ordered in the range (1, N).
Output: Ink, k ∈ (0, N) containing the output of the data flow analysis for each block.
1: function roundrobin
2: In0 = BI . Perform initialization
3: for all j, j ∈ (0, N) do
4: Inj = >
5: end for
6: change = true
7: while change do . Keep recomputing
8: change = false
9: for j = 1 to N − 1 do . Visit in a fixed order
10: temp =
⋃
p∈pred(j)
fp(Inp)
11: if temp 6= Inj then
12: Inj = temp
13: change = true
14: end if
15: end for
16: end while
17: end function
2.3.2 Work List Based Iterative Algorithm
The second algorithm presented in this thesis is called a Work list based iterative algorithm
presented in Algorithm 2. This algorithm eliminates drawbacks of Round-robin iterative
algorithm by computing data flow properties in a demand-driven manner and thus avoid-
ing redundant re-computations [11]. If the data flow value changes at any program point,
the Round-robin iterative algorithm recomputes the data flow properties of all blocks in-
discriminately because it does not track which concrete data flow properties changed in
an iteration. It tracks only the change scalar variable that does not distinguish between
different data flow properties.
Work list algorithm overcomes this drawback by introducing a work list that remembers
program points where data flow properties change. This enables to re-compute only data
flow properties that may be affected by a change.
When data flow property of a program point changes, the program point is added to the
work list. Subsequent re-computation is driven by program points included in the work list.
A program point is removed from the work list and all data flow properties of neighbouring
program points are then re-computed. All program points affected by this change are added
to the work list. Algorithm terminates when the work list is empty.
2.4 Taint Analysis
As noted above, taint analysis, a form of information-flow analysis, establishes whether val-
ues from untrusted methods and parameters may flow into security-sensitive operations [12].
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Algorithm 2 Work list algorithm
Input: A data flow framework containing N blocks. The Start node is numbered 0. The
rest of the blocks are arbitrary ordered in the range (1, N).
Output: Ink, k ∈ (0, N) containing the output of the data flow analysis for each block.
1: function worklist
2: In0 = BI . Perform initialization
3: for all j, j ∈ (0, N) do
4: Inj = >
5: add j to worklist
6: end for
7: while worklist is not empty do
8: remove the first block u from worklist
9: temp = Outj
10: Inj =
⋃
p∈pred(j)
Outp
11: Outj = fj(Inj)
12: if temp 6= Outj then . Compare the previous and current value
13: add succ(j) to worklist
14: end if
15: end while
16: end function
This use of data flow information to determine possible paths which an attacker can misuse
is called a taint propagation. It requires knowing where information enters the program and
how it flows through the program. The concept of taint analysis is not restricted only to
static analysis. For example, Perl programming language implements dynamic taint anal-
ysis in which uses runtime checking to make sure that user-supplied data are valid when
entering secure sensitive operations [1].
Information flow violations comprise the most security vulnerabilities in today’s Web
applications. In fact, at least four of the security threats defined in OWASP Top 10 con-
stitute information flow violations.
The goal of this work is to construct a static taint analyser that detects SQL injection
vulnerabilities. A program that has an exploitable SQL injection vulnerability contains a
data flow path from user supplied inputs to a method parsing SQL commands. The task
of the analyser is to find such a vulnerable path.
2.5 Rules for Taint Propagation
Security analysis tools commonly contain rules that define set of problems a tool should
report [3]. This enables extensibility of analysis tools in form of extending the default rule
set with new user-defined rules. The rules that define what an analysis tool should report
are just as important as analysis algorithms that the tool implements. Analysis tool cannot
report a problem outside of its rule set.
Solving taint propagation problems with static analysis requires a variety of different
rules. Because many security problems can be described as a taint propagation problems,
the most important rules are presented here:
• Source rules define program locations where tainted data enter the system. This
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location may be a system boundary such as an HTTP data delivering method in case
of web applications.
• Sink rules define program locations that should not receive tainted data (for example,
a method that interprets SQL commands).
• Pass-through rules define program locations where tainted data are propagated fur-
ther. This can be the case of variable assignments. The left side variable of an
assignment expression is tainted by a right side tainted variable.
• Cleanse rules are similar to pass-through rules except they clean the taint mark of a
variable. These are all input validation methods. For example, a method that escapes
all control characters in HTML code.
• Call and return rules define program locations where methods are called/returned
when performing a value-based interprocedural analysis. This approach to analysis is
more described in Section 2.6.1.
Figure 2.3 provides simple C# example how these rules work together to detect a
vulnerability. It shows three of the rules defined above (source, pass-through, and sink rule).
The method call Request.Form on the first line represents the source rule as it returns user-
defined HTTP Post data that may be potentially tainted. The assignment operator on the
first line represents the pass-through rule that moves value into the textboxValue variable.
The second line represents the sink rule. It calls custom method SaveIntoDatabase that
saves the textboxValue value into a database. A taint analyser should report this as
SQL injection vulnerability because the possibly tainted value flows into security intensive
method SaveIntoDatabase without proper sanitisation.
string textboxValue = Request.Form["textbox"];
SaveIntoDatabase(textBoxValue);
Figure 2.3: Application of taint propagation rules.
The most basic form of taint propagation marks flow values with a binary taint attribute.
This two-state attribute may represent either tainted or not tainted flow value as showed
in the previous example. In practice there is often a need to be more specific. Input can be
trusted for some purposes, but not for others. To overcome this problem, different types of
tainted data can be represented by different types of taint flags.
Different source rules can introduce data with different taint flags. For example, data
retrieved from the network could be labelled with a FROM_NETWORK taint flag. Data coming
from a configuration file could be marked with a FROM_CONFIG taint flag and so on.
It is important to realize that sink methods might be dangerous only in certain context.
For example, an SQL parsing method may be vulnerable only when passed data with the
FROM_NETWORK taint flag.
2.6 Interprocedural Data Flow Analysis
As described in Section 2.1.3, an interprocedural data flow analysis operates across method
boundaries as opposed to intraprocedural analysis that operates only on a single method [8].
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It uses calling relationships between methods and enables more precise analysis information.
Especially in the area of taint analysis, the interprocedural analysis might be much more
precise.
Various methods of interprocedural data flow analysis can be divided into two main
categories: functional approach or a value-based approach. The functional approach is
based on a summary flow functions that represent the effects of a method call. These
functions are context independent and parameterized.
Our solution uses the value-based approach to data flow analysis and therefore it is
more described in the following section.
2.6.1 Value-based Interprocedural Analysis
A value-based approach does not compute summary flow functions. Instead, it directly
computes data flow values by traversing a program during analysis. In particular, when
it encounters a method call, the inherited data flow values are propagated into the callee
method and its body is examined. At the end of the analysis of the callee’s body, synthesized
data flow values are propagated back into the caller and the caller method is resumed. This
approach requires traversing a method repeatedly for different calling contexts.
A value-based approach uses a supergraph as a representation of the analysed program.
The supergraph is a directed graph which connects CFGs of callers and callees by edges
indicating interprocedural control transfers [8].
In order to perform context sensitive analysis, one must remember the calling context.
Calling context of method r is defined as a sequence of callers of r starting from the initial
method. A calling context σ is denoted by a string c1 · · · ck of call site names. This
string represents a call sequence r1 · · · rk starting from the initial method. Value-based
interprocedural data flow analysis is defined in terms of data flow values that are pairs of
the form 〈σ,x〉 where σ represents the context and x ∈ L is the actual data flow value.
Apart from handling context, an interprocedural analysis must also handle scope rules
and parameter passing mechanism.
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Chapter 3
.NET Compiler Platform
In order to perform program analysis, the analyser needs syntactic and semantic information
about the program code being analysed. In our case, this information is obtained through
the APIs offered by the .NET Compiler Platform [10].
3.1 Introduction
Traditionally, compilers are black boxes—source code as the input is processed by a compiler
and then assemblies are produced. Compiler internally builds up a deep understanding of
source code it processes. Unfortunately, this knowledge is unavailable to developers and is
forgotten after the translated output has been processed [14].
Nowadays, the state of the art is to enable access to this compiler’s knowledge. We
rely on code analysis and refactoring tools to improve your code quality. As these tools
get smarter, they need access to more and more of the deep code knowledge that only
compilers possess. This is the mission of .NET Compiler Platform which is a Microsoft
developed open-source C# and Visual Basic .NET compiler with rich code analysis APIs.
Instead of being black box translators, thanks to the .NET Compiler Platform, compilers
are platforms—APIs that we can use for code related tasks in our tools and applications.
This transition from black box compilers to platforms greatly reduces difficulties when
implementing code focused applications. It creates many opportunities for innovation in
areas such as meta-programming, code generation and transformation, interactive use of
the C# and VB languages, and embedding of C# and VB in domain specific languages.
The .NET Compiler Platform provides APIs that mirror a traditional compiler pipeline.
This pipeline is showed in Figure 3.1.
Parser
Symbols &
Metadata
Import
Binder IL Emitter
Figure 3.1: .NET Compiler Platform pipeline.
Each phrase is presented as a separate component. The first component is the parse
phrase which performs a syntactic analysis of source code. Second component is the dec-
laration phase, where declarations from source and imported metadata are analyzed to
form named symbols. During the binding phrase, the symbols are matched with identifiers
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located in the code. Emit phrase is responsible for emitting all the information that was
build up by compiler in previous phrases.
Syntax Tree
API
Symbol API
Binding and Flow
Analysis APIs Emit API
Parser
Symbols &
Metadata
Import
Binder IL Emitter
Figure 3.2: .NET Compiler Platform APIs.
Corresponding to each phrase defined above, an object model allows access to the in-
formation at that phrase. The parsing phrase is exposed as a syntax tree, the declaration
phrase as a hierarchical symbol table, the binding phase as a model that exposes the result of
the compiler’s semantic analysis, and the emit phrase as an API that emits IL instructions.
3.2 Syntax Tree API
The most fundamental data structure exposed by the .NET Compiler platform is a syntax
tree [14]. Syntax trees represent lexical and syntactic structure of source code. They
serve two fundamental purposes: a) to allow tools such as IDEs, code analysis tools, and
refactorings to easily examine and process syntactic structures. b) to enable tools modifying
the structure of a syntax tree without directly manipulate with underlying source code.
Example of such tree representing a C# statement is showed in Figure 4.1.
Syntax trees are primary structure when dealing with code analysis, refactoring, or
code generation. These tasks cannot be performed without examining hierarchical syntax
structure provided by syntax trees.
Syntax trees have three important properties:
1. The first property is called a full fidelity. This means that the syntax tree contains ev-
ery syntactic element of underlying source code. Every grammatical construct, lexical
token, and everything else between including whitespaces, comments, and compiler
macros is recorded by the syntax tree. Syntax errors in source code are also repre-
sented by missing or skipped syntax tokens in the syntax tree structure.
2. The second property is a direct consequence of the full fidelity. The syntax trees
are round-trippable which means that they can be transformed back into the original
source code without lost of information. From a syntax node, it is possible to get
textual representation of this node and its sub-tree. Thanks to this property, by
editing the syntax tree, you effectively change the underlying source code. Manual
text manipulation is therefore abstracted away.
3. The syntax trees are also immutable and thread-safe. Immutability means that the
syntax trees cannot be modified once they were constructed. Although the trees are
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immutable, modification of each syntax tree is accessible via factory methods that
create new snapshot of the syntax tree when modified. Such creation of new objects
is still efficient because the newly created objects reuse underlying syntax nodes.
The immutability and thread-safety enable to modify structure of the syntax tree
simultaneously from different threads without locking or duplication.
Each syntax tree is made up of nodes, tokens, and trivia.
3.2.1 Syntax Nodes
Syntax nodes represent syntactic constructs as declarations, statements, clauses, and ex-
pressions. Each type of syntax node is distinguished by its class type derived from the
SyntaxNode class. These nodes are non-terminal nodes which mean that they have at least
one child. Each node has a parent node that can be accessed through the Parent property.
This property is null for the root element.
Each syntax node subclass exposes its children through strongly typed properties. For
example, a BinaryExpressionSyntax node class has three additional properties specific to
binary operators: Left, OperatorToken, and Right.
3.2.2 Syntax Tokens
Syntax tokens are the terminals of the language grammar, representing the smallest syn-
tactic fragments of the code. Syntax tokens include keywords, identifiers, literals, and
punctuation. They are terminal nodes—syntax nodes are never parents of other nodes in a
syntax tree. For efficiency purposes, the SyntaxToken type is a CLR value type. It exposes
the Value property representing a raw value of the underlying syntax token. This might
be identifier name, string literal, or number.
3.2.3 Syntax Trivia
Syntax trivia are pieces of source code that are insignificant to syntactic and semantic
understanding of the program. These are whitespaces, comments, and compiler macros.
Although they hold no useful information necessary to compile the program, they are
important to meet full fidelity property of syntax tree. For example, refactoring tools rely
on syntax trivia to fully reconstruct source code including comments and whitespaces.
Syntax trivia are not directly part of the syntax tree. Instead, they are accessible
through concrete syntax token as collections. TrailingTrivia and LeadingTrivia col-
lections contains syntax trivia that precede and follow the syntax token in source code
respectively.
3.3 Semantic Model
Syntax trees represent the lexical and syntactical information of source code. While this
information is enough to describe the declarations and logic in the source code, it is not
sufficient to identify relationships. Given the large semantic complexity of types, fields,
methods, or local variables, it requires deep understanding of semantic rules to detect such
relationships. For example, identifiers with the same name might be scattered throughout
the source code and semantic analyser must be able to determine to where every identifier
refers.
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Programs often depends on external libraries that have not accessible source codes,
nevertheless the semantic model can still refer to symbols defined in those libraries.
A semantic model represents all the semantic information for a single source file. Se-
mantic model can be used to discover symbols referenced at a specific source code location,
resultant type of any expression, error diagnostics, and others.
3.4 Diagnostics API
One of the most important and also most overlooked properties of code analysers is the
result reporting. Ability to clearly report issues to the user is of same importance as the
ability to detect them [3]. The results need to be presented in such a way that the user
can make a decision about the correctness and importance of the result and thus make an
appropriate action. This action may include code change or adjustment of the tool.
Probably the best option is to integrate code analysis results into a user’s integrated
development environment (IDE). This brings advantages to the user:
• Analysis report is integrated in a familiar environment of user’s IDE. This might
decrease learning curve required to work with the tool.
• Two applications (IDE and code analyser) are united. User does not need to switch
between the two when working.
• It is possible to directly navigate to a code issue within IDE’s editor. Analysis tool
developers thus do not have to reinvent code browsing.
This Bachelor thesis applies code analysis to ASP.NET MVC applications. Therefore,
commonly used IDE for developing on this platform is the Microsoft Visual Studio [5]. In the
past, developing custom warning and reporting add-ins targeting the Visual Studio involved
using a Visual Studio SDK (software development kit). This is no longer necessary; the
.NET Compiler Platform provides a Diagnostics API that simplifies creating such add-ins.
Diagnostics API automatically runs analysis on a background thread, underlines faulty
code in the IDE editor, populates Visual Studio Error List, and performs other useful tasks.
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Chapter 4
Analyser Application Design
Previous chapters dealt with a web-based security, data flow analysis theory, and with
the Roslyn Compiler API. The chapters provided essential information about how a static
analyser based on the .NET Platform might work. This chapter is concerned with the
design of such static analyser that was implemented as a part of this Bachelor thesis. The
proposed analyser performs the value-based interprocedural analysis on the ASP.NET MVC
platform.
The analyser performs static taint analysis to detect SQL injection security vulnerabili-
ties. SQL injection vulnerability and the ways how to mitigate it is described in Section 1.4.
The analyser can be divided into two main logic stages. The first stage is a control flow
graphs construction and the second following stage is a data flow analysis.
4.1 Control Flow Graphs Construction
As stated in Chapter 3, the analyser needs syntactic and semantic information about anal-
ysed program in order to perform analysis. This information can be viewed as an input to
the analyser. We decided to use the .NET Compiler Platform and its APIs to obtain this
information for the following reasons:
• .NET Compiler Platform is under the active development of the Microsoft Corpora-
tion. Microsoft puts high emphasis on the project as it is meant to be the primary
compiler platform for next release of the .NET Platform [9]. APIs of this platform are
meant to be used by .NET developers to create new analysis, refactoring, and other
tools.
• .NET Compiler Platform is an open-source software. This may introduce higher level
of collaboration between the platform developers and other contributors.
• .NET Compiler Platform has easy-to-use C# API that can be utilised to build data
flow analyser on top of it. Detailed description of the API can be found in Chapter 3.
.NET Compiler Platform provides abstract syntax trees (ASTs) that can be poten-
tially used as a program representation during intraprocedural analysis as described in
Section 2.1.4. Despite this fact we decided to use control flow graphs (CFGs) or more
precisely a supergraph as an interprocedural program representation.
Because the .NET Compiler Platform does not provide API for CFG creation and
manipulation, the analyser constructs the graphs on its own. AST is represented as an
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object model formed as a tree structure in the .NET Compiler Platform. Such a tree is
showed in Figure 4.1 for a C# statement (int name = 5;).
LocalDeclaration
VariableDeclaration
PredefinedType
int
VariableDeclarator
name EqualsValueClause
= NumericLiteral
5
Figure 4.1: Example of AST for a C# variable declaration statement.
CFG is created from concrete AST by in-order traversal through the tree. The traversal
logic visits syntax nodes and decides whether to append new basic blocks into the CFG.
There are two cases when new basic blocks are created and appended to the CFG:
1. When the currently visited syntax node changes a control flow structure of the anal-
ysed program. The currently constructed CFG must reflect the control flow of the
underlying analysed program. For example, let’s an IfStatementSyntax be the cur-
rently visited syntax node. This node changes the control flow because it introduces
branching—the program executes either if or else branch. Underlying CFG must
take into account this branching and contain two edges representing distinct control
flow of these two branches.
2. When the currently visited syntax node changes a taint flow of the analysed program.
Basic blocks contain flow rules that manage taint propagation of values through the
analysed program. For example, let’s an AssignmentExpressionSyntax be the cur-
rently visited syntax node. Because variable assignment transfers r-value from the
right side of the assignment to the left side l-value, this data transfer is represented
with new basic block containing a pass-through rule.
Figure 4.2 shows example of such constructed CFG. Each node in this graph contains
one taint rule that match taint propagation of the underlying C# code. The CFG contains
call, return, and pass-through rules which were described in Section 2.5. Every individual
CFG’s basic block contains only one taint rule.
Our analyser constructs such CFG for each individual method of the analysed program.
All the constructed CFGs then form a supergraph—abstract representation of the analyser
program when performing the value-based interprocedural analysis. So the output of this
part of the analyser is a set of CFGs where each CFG is a representation of a single method.
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string k = GetValue();
if (k.Count() > 5)
{
var f = k;
}
else
{
var z = Foo(k);
}
return k;
call GetValue() method
taint k if
GetValue()’s re-
turn value tainted
taint f if k tainted call Foo(k) method
taint z if
Foo(k)’s re-
turn value tainted
return k from the current method
Figure 4.2: A C# code snippet with the corresponding CFG.
4.2 Data Flow Analysis
Given CFGs that represent individual methods of the analysed program, the analyser is
able to perform the taint analysis.
The first step is to find a starting point of the data flow analysis. Typically, this would
be the main function when performing analysis on a C or C++ program, because the main
function is the starting point when executing the program. In the case of the ASP.NET
MVC Platform, such starting points are action methods. Action method is a method that
is directly invoked when accessing a web resource and is used to process incoming HTTP
requests [5]. Action method parameters serve as an user input transmitted through an
HTTP request. They may contain data from the following sources:
• Data provided by the user in HTML form elements.
• The values obtained using the application routes.
• Data included in the query string portion of the request URL.
• Files that have been uploaded as part of the request.
All these sources may be tainted and thus all parameters of action methods are initially
in the taint state.
Our analyser uses the Work list algorithm to perform the data flow analysis. This
algorithm is described in Section 2.3.2. Algorithm traverses a CFG of each action method
while computing data flow information.
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4.2.1 Representation of Information
The most common representation of information during a data flow analysis are sets as
described in Section 2.1.5. Recall that the data flow equations for taint analysis as defined
in Section 2.2.1 are:
Inn =

BI n is Start block⋃
p∈pred(n)
Outp otherwise (4.1)
Outn = fn(Inn) (4.2)
For unidirectional problems as taint analysis, having two sets of variables Inn and Outn
is not essential—it just increases the readability of the equations [8]. To avoid the overhead,
we substitute for Out in the equations for In, and get
Inn =

BI n is Start block⋃
p∈pred(n)
fn(Inn) otherwise (4.3)
Our analyser design therefore uses single set at basic block n to represent a taint infor-
mation Inn and Outn. Given the example in the Figure 4.2, the CFG is built out of 6 basic
blocks. The analyser keeps record of 6 sets where each set represents taint information at
a given basic block.
4.2.2 Interprocedural Analysis Design
Our solution performs the value-based interprocedural analysis that is briefly described in
Section 2.6. This approach does not involve precomputation of summary flow functions.
Instead, it directly computes the data flow information and propagates the inherited data
flow information from callers to callees and the synthesized data flow information from
callees to callers.
Because our analyser performs context sensitive analysis, a calling context c1 · · · ck must
be kept. The analyser defines a call stack to represent the calling context. Every call stack
entry contains a call site name cn and all data flow sets belonging to the call site cn.
When the Work list algorithm reaches a call rule, new entry is pushed onto the call
stack and the inherited data flow values are propagated into the callee method. Then the
callee method body is examined and data flow values stored in the top call stack entry are
refined. At the end of the analysis of the callee’s body, synthesized data flow values are
propagated back and the top call stack entry is removed from the call stack.
4.2.3 Inherited And Synthesized Data Flow Information
In order to render an interprocedural analysis useful, we need to implement a transfer of
data flow information when calling and returning from methods. This transfer applies to
method arguments, static data, or method return values.
Method arguments are passed to the callee as synthesized data flow values. Arguments
of the called method must be translated into method’s formal parameters. Such translation
is showed in Figure 4.3. At the end of the analysis of the callee’s body, return value is
propagated back as synthesized data flow value.
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Static values are treated the same way as method arguments. If some static value is
tainted before performing a method call, then this static value is considered as an inherited
data flow value. This inherited data flow value is therefore propagated into the callee
method with other synthesized data flow values.
public string Foo(string val)
{
return val;
}
...
string first = ...;
string second = ...;
string ret = Foo(first + second);
first ∪ second
first second
val
ret
Figure 4.3: A C# code snippet with its diagram of inherited and synthesized data flow
values during a value-based interprocedural analysis.
4.3 Language Features Influencing Interprocedural Analysis
Interprocedural data flow analysis is influenced by language features that support high level
abstraction related to method calls. In this section, we discuss such features supported by
the C# language. Unfortunately, our design does not take them into account because this
thesis is focused only on the basics of interprocedural analysis.
One such feature is the ability to call methods recursively. When dealing with recursion,
a mechanism of summarizing the context is needed in the case of a value-based analysis [8].
Many practical value-based approaches perform context insensitive analysis in the recursive
portions of program. It is possible to perform context sensitive interprocedural analysis in
the presence of recursion, though.
Other feature influencing interprocedural analysis is a reference parameter passing mech-
anism. When passing a parameter by value, a simple assignment mechanism is sufficient
whereas call by reference parameter passing should be modelled by pointer assignments. In
the presence of reference parameter passing a particular call may create aliasing between for-
mal parameters or between formal parameters and global variables within a callee’s method
body. Our design does not take a pointer analysis into account and so the correctness and
precision of our analysis is therefore affected.
The same applies to method pointers, lambdas, and sub typing mechanism resulting in
dynamic dispatch of method calls. Such calls cannot be determined during the compile-
time. Exception handling mechanisms have a similar effect.
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Chapter 5
Analyser Implementation
This chapter examines the implementation of a static taint analyser that was implemented
as a part of this Bachelor thesis. The analyser reflects design decisions and techniques that
were explained in previous Chapter 4. As mentioned before, we decided to utilise the .NET
Compiler Platform to retrieve syntactic and semantic information about analysed program.
The .NET Compiler Platform provides compilers for both C# and Visual Basic languages
with separated APIs for each language. We aimed to support only the C# language and
thus to use only the C# APIs of the .NET Compiler Platform. The analyser is itself
implemented in the C#, more specifically in its latest released version C# 5.0.
5.1 External Libraries
The analyser utilises three external libraries to fulfil its functionality:
• .NET Compiler Platform is used substantially in the implementation. Syntactic and
semantic information is provided by the Syntax Tree API and Semantic Model, re-
spectively. Diagnostics API is used to present analysis results to the user. All these
APIs are described in Chapter 3.
• Ninject is an open-source dependency injector for the .NET Platform1. We use Ninject
to manage and inject dependencies in our program.
• Immutable Collections library provides collections that are thread safe and guaranteed
to never change their content2. Immutable Collections are used throughout the .NET
Compiler Platform APIs to satisfy immutability and thread-safety guarantee of the
Syntax Tree API as mentioned in Section 3.2.
5.2 Application Structure
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the analyser is divided into two main application layers (control
flow graphs construction and data flow analysis).
1http://www.ninject.org
2http://blogs.msdn.com/b/bclteam/p/immutable.aspx
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5.2.1 Control Flow Graphs Construction
The purpose and design of this layer is described in Section 4.1. This layer is made accessible
by the following simple interface:
public interface IMethodGraphsRetriever
{
MethodGraphDictionary GetGraphsFor(SemanticModel semanticModel);
}
This interface declares a single method GetGraphsFor. The method returns an object
of type MethodGraphDictionary containing CFGs of all methods of an analysed program.
5.2.2 Data Flow Analysis
This layer is more described in Section 4.2 and is accessible by the following interface:
internal interface IAnalyser
{
ISet<Diagnostic> Analyse(MethodGraphDictionary solutionGraphs);
}
This interface declares a single method Analyse that performs a static taint analysis.
It returns Diagnostic objects that represent all detected analysis issues.
5.3 Results Reporting
The analyser is integrated into the Visual Studio IDE through the Diagnostics API that is
described in Section 3.4. Diagnostics API contains the following interface:
public interface ISemanticModelAnalyzer : IDiagnosticAnalyzer
{
void AnalyzeSemanticModel(SemanticModel semanticModel,
Action<Diagnostic> addDiagnostic);
}
Ability to report new diagnostic issues is made available through this interface. Every
issue is represented by the Diagnostic class. Possible output of the analyser is showed in
Figure 5.1 where the analyser detected an SQL injection vulnerability. Clearly, developer
has an immediate feedback of the analysis results and knows exactly where the issue is
located.
5.4 Development and Testing
The analyser was developed in the Visual Studio 2013 IDE with the .NET Compiler Plat-
form SDK installed. This SDK adds support of the .NET Compiler Platform into the Visual
Studio.
The analyser was tested on a set of ASP.NET MVC code examples in order to verify
the functionality of the analyser. The tested functionality covered:
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Figure 5.1: SQL injection vulnerability warning inside the Visual Studio 2013 IDE.
• The ability to create control flow graphs that reflect various C# language constructs.
These include expressions, operations, conditional statements, blocks, methods, and
others. Unfortunately, not all constructs are supported. For example, the analyser
has no support for asynchronous programming introduced in C# 5.0 [13].
• The ability to perform intraprocedural data flow analysis. This includes testing the
Work list algorithm and its ability to execute taint rules on taint sets.
• The ability to perform interprocedural data flow analysis. Testing included performing
taint analysis across methods to verify the functionality of the call stack and the ability
to handle inherited and synthesized data flow values.
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Conclusion
The goal of the thesis was to construct a static taint analyser based on the .NET Compiler
Platform. At the beginning, this text presented the most prevalent security threats web
developers must face nowadays. Then, it considered a static data flow analysis as the
technique that helps to mitigate such threats. The main scope of this thesis focused on the
theory of a data flow analysis and its practical application in order to construct a static taint
analyser. Such static analyser was created and built upon the .NET Compiler Platform
and is able to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities on the ASP.NET MVC platform.
It could be beneficial to further develop the implemented analyser to perform the anal-
ysis on a Common Intermediate Language (CIL) instead of relying on the .NET Compiler
Platform. Such transition would enable to perform static analysis on any CLI-compatible
language including C#, F#, Visual Basic .NET, C++/CLI, and others. Apart from being
more general, the analyser would not need to support language specific features such as
asynchronous programming, as these features would be implemented by CIL instructions.
Other possibility to improve the analyser is to embed pointer analysis that would in-
crease the precision of the analysis. Such improvement would be able to resolve dynamic
dispatch of method calls during analysis.
Finally, the implementation could be generalized to an extendable .NET data flow
framework that detects a range variety of patterns. Instead of hard-coding them, such
patterns could be described by user-defined rules that can be mixed and matched to reflect
current development needs.
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